This paper examines Duhem's concept of good sense as an attempt to support a non rule-governed account of rationality in theory choice. Faced with the underdetermination of theory by evidence thesis and the continuity thesis, Duhem tried to account for the ability of scientists to choose theories that continuously grow to a natural classification. I will examine the concept of good sense and the problems that stem from it. I will also present a recent attempt by David Stump to link good sense to virtue epistemology. I will argue that even though this approach can be useful for the better comprehension of the concept of good sense, there are some substantial differences between virtue epistemologists and Duhem.
Introduction
Having advanced the continuity thesis and the underdetermination of theory by evidence thesis, Pierre Duhem was faced with the problem of how scientists could choose between theories with equal empirical consequences. His solution was based on the concept of good sense by which he tried to advance a theory of rationality that combines both descriptive and normative elements. Being an important physicist, historian and philosopher of science, Duhem was well aware of the scientific practice and tried to describe it, but also tried to develop a normative account of rationality that should guide scientists when faced with the problem of theory choice.
In this paper I explain how Duhem's account of scientific method and his concept of good sense can contribute to the current debate on rationality in theory choice. In section 2, I review how the problem of theory choice arises. Section 3 examines how the concept of good sense was developed to account for the problem of underdetermination, but also some difficulties that arise from it. Section 4 presents a recent attempt to link the concept of good sense to virtue epistemology, advanced by David Stump. Finally, in section 5, I develop an interpretation of the concept of good sense which I believe fits better with Duhem's view of scientific method. I propose that by viewing good sense as the properties of an ideal scientist, we can overcome some of the difficulties faced by Duhem's original development of the concept of good sense.
Natural classification, underdetermination and continuity
Taking theories to be abstract systems that summarize and classify in a logical manner a set of experimental laws, Duhem opposed any attempt to explain the phenomena by searching 1 . According to Duhem, even though physical theory cannot reveal the unobservable reality, it can still teach us something of the world, because "the more complete it becomes, the more we apprehend that the logical order in which theory orders experimental laws is the reflection of an ontological order, the more we suspect that the relations it establishes among the data of observation correspond to real relations among things" (Duhem, 1954, p. 26) . Since physical theory is a representation and not an explanation, even at the 'ideal end of science' it will not reveal the real causes of the The problem of underdetermination for Duhem arises from the holistic character of confirmation 3 . According to Duhem, when we test a theory, we never test it in isolation from auxiliary assumptions, and when the experiment does not give us the expected outcome, either the hypothesis we are testing or one (or more) of the auxiliary assumptions might be false. The experiment cannot tell us which might be false: "the only thing the experiment teaches us is that among the propositions used to predict the phenomena and to establish whether it would be produced, there is at least one error; but where this error lies is just what it does not tell us" (Duhem, 1954, p. 185) . That means that neither logic nor particular experience can determine in which hypothesis the problem lies.
This holistic character of theory testing led Duhem to argue that we could always save a theory from refutation, that is, to make it fit the empirical evidence, by changing the auxiliary hypotheses (Ibid, p. 216) . In this way we can produce different theories that will equally well fit the empirical data. This leads to the thesis of the underdetermination of the theory by evidence (UTE) because empirical evidence cannot help us when we have to decide between two empirically equivalent rival theories. UTE is especially important since we usually think of experiment as the empirical test we can perform in order to judge whether our theory is satisfactory when its consequences are compared with the evidence. If the experiment cannot guide us to decide between rival theories, we seem to lack an empirical source of decision. In the current debate, we can distinguish arguments of weak and strong underdetermination 4 .
The former, which was developed by Duhem, allows for future empirical evidence to discern between two rival equivalent hypotheses. The latter holds that in principle we could never, based only on our experience, be able to choose one hypothesis over another because they will always be compatible with the same evidence.
One way to address the problem of underdetermination is simply to hold that no choice can be made in such cases. Another is to choose among the two theories with pragmatic criteria. Duhem recognized that UTE would not be problematic to those that accept conventionalism and support that one can adopt some theories to save some phenomena, other theories to save other phenomena. He stressed that "if we confine ourselves simply to logic, we cannot prevent a physicist from representing by several incompatible theories diverse groups of laws, or even a single group of laws; we cannot condemn incoherence in physical theory" (Duhem, 1954, p. 111) . There is no logical contradiction in using different theories as instruments to save different sets of phenomena, given that we do not mix up these theories. Still, Duhem strongly believed that physical theory should be logically unified, even though neither logic nor experience lead to this conclusion. This is a strong "innate feeling of ours" (Ibid., p. 102), an aspiration towards unity in science, which cannot be justified but also cannot be stifled 5 . Duhem believed that theory cannot be just a convenient system; it is logically organized, unified and intended to lead towards natural classification. That is why he believed that rational choice in science is possible and tried to account for it by developing the concept of good sense.
Good Sense and Rational Choice
Duhem noticed that when experience is not enough for choosing among two alternative theories with the same empirical consequences, various criteria need to be taken into consideration. These include the scope of the theory, the number of hypotheses (Duhem, 1892, p. 22) , novel predictions (Duhem, 1954, p. 28, p. 195 It follows that by pointing at the virtues possessed by the theory we cannot describe or explain completely the choice of the scientists, nor can these virtues justify the outcome of their choice to the exclusion of other choices. Duhem recognized that even if we grant that all scientists agree globally on the importance of these virtues, they have the freedom to employ them differently and therefore might make different choices (Duhem, 1954, p. 288) . Even though criteria to describe theory choice can be found, they cannot determine the choice uniquely. What can be concluded from this analysis is that the particular virtues of a theory do not suffice to justify an exclusive outcome in theory choice. In abandoning a particular hypothesis or in choosing a certain theory, scientists need to make judgments; they need to choose by weighing the theoretical virtues and they do this, according to Duhem, by employing their good sense.
Duhem argued that when we are faced with a negative outcome from experiment neither experience nor logic dictates which of the hypothesis must be abandoned; there is no "absolute principle" (Duhem, 1954, p. 216) to guide scientists, and in order to come up with a decision "everyone should follow his own methods" (Ibid, p. 99). A scientist may choose to keep some hypotheses which may be abandoned by another scientist; still, since logic does not impose a solution, they do not have the right to "accuse one another of illogicality" (Ibid, p. 216). Faced with a negative outcome from the experiment, one may either choose to preserve the existing theories by changing auxiliary assumptions to accommodate the new facts, or may replace the old theory with a fundamentally different one that accounts for the new and the old facts. Both moves are logically consistent and equally sound and it is the good sense of the scientist that guides him to which hypothesis is to be preserved. Their choice is justified only retrospectively by empirical evidence: "the methods they follow are justifiable only by experiment" (Ibid, p. 217). The fact that scientists seem to choose the right theories, the theories leading to a more unified and novel predictive theories, despite the problem of underdetermination, led Duhem to infer that there must be some characteristic of scientists which is responsible for their choice. To explain this fact, he invoked the concept of good sense. It is important to note that the choices of the scientists faced with theory choice come later on to be supported by empirical evidence and therefore this shows that they have made the right choices.
The fact that there is no strict rule to guide scientists when faced with the problem of underdetermination, but nevertheless they manage to make a choice which is later supported by empirical evidence, can be brought out by the following historical incident. When the observations of Uranus's orbit did not match the Newtonian predictions, scientists had two choices. They could either modify the theory or make the needed adjustments to the auxiliary assumptions. In order to explain why the orbit of Uranus was not the predicted one, scientists did not abandon Newtonian physics. On the contrary, they changed the auxiliary assumptions by supposing that there was a hitherto unobserved planet, Neptune, whose motion perturbs that of Uranus and is therefore responsible for its irregular motion. Few years later relevant observations confirmed Urbain Le Verrier's prediction of the existence of Neptune. In this case we see that changes in the auxiliaries were successfully made to save Newtonian physics. In the case of the irregular motion of Mercury, however, changes in the auxiliaries could not explain the phenomena and more radical moves were needed. Even though Le
Verrier proposed the existence of the hypothetical planet Vulcan to be responsible for the perturbed motion of Mercury, changes in the auxiliaries could not save the theory. It was after the theory of relativity triumphed over Newtonian physics that the gravitational field equations explained the anomalous advance of the perihelion of Mercury. These historical episodes show that there is no recipe which will lead scientists to a unique decision. In some cases changes in the auxiliaries can save the theory, leading to a natural classification, whereas in other cases the only way to explain the phenomena is by the abandonment of the theory and the advancement of a new one. The point that needs to be stressed is that no algorithm can be provided to determine theory choice uniquely. Sometimes scientists may need to change auxiliary assumptions in favor of the theory, while other times no such "timid" move can lead to a solution and more "bold" moves are needed. The only guidance as to which path one is to follow is, according to Duhem, the scientist's good sense. The fact these choices are later supported by empirical evidence shows that good sense leads to the right choices, or as Duhem would put it, the choices which lead to a more unified theory growing to a natural classification.
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Let us examine more carefully what exactly good sense is. According to Duhem, good sense is "these motivations which do not proceed from logic and yet direct our choices" (Duhem, 1954, p. 217) . It is a cluster of virtues scientists possess which in the cases of underdetermination allows them to weigh evidence impartially, "leaving their interests and passions aside" (Duhem, 1991, p. 43) . These virtues, as Duhem noted, are intellectual as well as moral and they are employed by scientists in the case of theory choice in order to favor the hypothesis that will be more fruitful and lead to a theory that would resemble a "perfect theory". Good sense exists in every scientist to some degree and is found in agreement with common sense. Duhem believed good sense can be developed by every scientist and it can be cultivated and sharpened by training and practice. Since it leads scientists to choose more fruitful theories, every scientist ought to cultivate his good sense to increase scientific progress and to reach the desired end of science, which is a natural classification. According to Duhem "physicists may hasten this judgment and increase the rapidity of scientific progress by trying consciously to make good sense within themselves more lucid and more vigilant" (Duhem, 1954, p. 218) . Also, he stressed that scientists should never let their personal interest guide them in their decision because this action delays the progress of physics. Even though good sense is employed to provide guidance where there is no strict recipe, this absence of strict algorithmic rules does not lead to relativity of scientific knowledge because by employing their good sense, scientists manage to promote theories which are later empirically confirmed. Duhem recognized that the concept of good sense cannot be justified or explained further, but it is necessary in order to explain the course of the history of science. Duhem was a great admirer of Pascal and he often said, paraphrasing
Pascal, that good sense is 'these reasons which reason does not know' or 'reasons of the heart' (Ibid., p. 217), and used this to support his claim that no rule can be provided to describe exactly how scientists manage to choose among two rival theories. can resolve this conflict of good sense, besides empirical evidence. Duhem admitted that both scientists can hold that they have good sense on their side until empirical evidence is available to support one of the two theories. As he noted, "if two different theories represent the same facts with the same approximation, physical method considers them as having absolutely the same validity; it does not have the right to dictate our choice between equivalent theories and is bound to leave us free. No doubt the physicist will choose between these logically equivalent theories, but the motives which will dictate our choice will be considerations of elegance, simplicity, convenience, and grounds of suitability which are 7 According to Duhem (Duhem, 1954, p. 218) , such is the case of Biot, who abandoned the emission hypothesis as the experiment of Foucault showed that light travels faster in air than in water. That was not an example of a crucial experiment which supported wave optics to the emission hypothesis. According to Duhem, it would have been simply a lack of good sense if Biot continued to resist wave optics.
essentially subjective, contingent, and variable with time, with schools, and with persons; as serious as these motives may be in certain cases, they will never be of the nature that necessitates adhering to one of the two theories and rejecting the other, for only the discovery of a fact that would be represented by one of the theories, and not by the other, would result in a forced opinion" (Ibid, p. 288). It seems that on the one hand Duhem invoked the concept of good sense as a solution to the problem of underdeterminaion, while on the other hand he argued that it is not capable of leading to a determinate choice without (eventually) empirical evidence justifying it. If so, good sense seems insufficient to provide us a basis for choice; at best it seems to explain why a scientist chose a theory when we examine his choice.
Therefore, it can be descriptive, but it cannot provide us with a solution when faced with the problem of theory choice.
Before moving to the next section in which we are going to examine possible interpretations of the concept of good sense, I would like to stress Duhem's motivations for developing the concept. Independently of whether we aim at constructing an empirically adequate theory, or a true theory, or a theory that leads to the real structure of nature, it is necessary to provide an account of rational choice. Good sense is an attempt to provide us with an explanation of how scientists choose theories that tend to become natural classifications of the observed phenomena. Also, even if we are in the first case, which is searching only for empirically adequate theories, it still seems quite simplistic to avoid trying to advance a normative theory of rational choice, since even the construction of an empirically adequate theory is not a simple procedure. Even an empirically adequate theory needs some intellectual virtues in order to be constructed. If we want to argue that rational choice is possible, we have to provide an account of how it is possible and what makes it possible. Duhem recognized that such an account will never be exhaustive; still, we can have some clue in virtue of what scientists may acquire theories that lead to the real structure of the world.
Duhem as virtue epistemologist
When discussing German science, Duhem pointed to the virtues that need to be employed by scientists in order to reach objective decisions: "in order to estimate correctly the agreement of a physical theory with the facts, it is not enough to be a good mathematician and skillful experimenter; one must also be an impartial and faithful judge" (Duhem, 1991, p. 218) .
Moreover, he stated that "In the realm of every science, but more particularly in the realm of history, the pursuit of the truth not only requires intellectual abilities, but also calls for moral qualities: rectitude, probity, detachment from all interest and all passions" (Ibid., p. 43). The fact that Duhem seems to take knowledge subject to the moral and intellectual qualities of the scientist, recently made David Stump (2007) link Duhem's concept of good sense with virtue epistemology. Stump notes that "Despite his holism and his famous thesis that it is always possible to save a scientific theory from refutation by empirical evidence, Duhem thinks that scientists are able to weigh evidence and to make decisions, and that the decisions they make depend on the intellectual and moral virtues of the scientist as a cognitive agent" (Stump, 2007, p. 151 can never offer us their intrinsic properties. As already noted, a true theory is a perfect theory which will classify in a natural order all observable and unobservable phenomena. According to Duhem, a perfect theory, which is a theory that will reflect the true ontological order, is not achievable: "we do not possess this perfect theory, and mankind will never possess it;
what we possess and what mankind will always possess is an imperfect and provisional theory, which by its innumerable groupings, hesitations and repentances proceeds slowly toward that ideal form which would be a natural classification" (Duhem, 1954, p. 302 ). Since we do not have access to the unobservable, the best we can reach at the ideal end of science is a natural classification of the observed phenomena, which will reveal the structure unobservable entities have, without revealing their intrinsic properties. This means that there is an essential difference between Duhem and virtue epistemologists, since Duhem believes, contrary to virtue epistemologists, that we are epistemically restricted and that can never reach the true order of nature. Still, it can be argued against this objection that one can adopt a weaker thesis and support that even though natural classification may not reveal the truth about the unobservable, it will be true for the observable phenomena. Also, one may argue 1 6 that it is legitimate to aim at a particular epistemic goal independently of whether this goal is achievable or not.
Another difficulty for the identification of Duhem as a virtue epistemologist concerns the essential difference in the motivation of virtue epistemologists and Duhem. Virtue epistemologists try to justify what it is to have a true belief, using the moral virtues of an agent. That is, they are in the business of justification. On the contrary, Duhem did not invoke the concept of good sense to justify the scientist's belief in a theory. As noted in the previous section, he recognized that we are justified to believe a theory is a natural classification only when empirical evidence comes to support it. He also noted that the highest test for our belief of a theory to be a natural classification is "to ask it to indicate in advance things which the future alone will reveal" (Ibid., p. 28). Therefore, a scientist is justified to believe that a theory is a natural classification only when some empirical evidence supports it or when the theory has become a "prophet for us" (Ibid., p. 27), that is, when it has managed to make novel predictions. The point is that good sense does not justify the choice of the theory, as Stump's reconstruction of good sense would suggest. Duhem did not develop the concept of good sense to answer when we are justified in believing that a theory is true or when it is more probable to be true; as already noted, he is not in the business of justification.
Duhem proposed the concept of good sense neither as a method of science nor to justify the scientist's belief in a theory. Good sense was invoked as a solution to a particular problem: theory choice. It cannot be seen as a method for constructing true beliefs nor as justifying them. Duhem developed a deductive account of scientific method, which is captured in the following four steps: "(1) the definition and measurement of physical magnitudes; (2) the selection of hypotheses; (3) the mathematical development of the theory;
(4) the comparison of the theory with experiment" (Duhem, 1954, p. 21) . Good sense does 
Good Sense and Perfect Scientists
Having examined the virtue epistemology approach to Duhem's concept of good sense, proposed by Stump, I would like to suggest another way to develop it. Firstly, we should recall the perfect theory invoked by Duhem. According to Duhem, a perfect theory "would be a complete and adequate metaphysical explanation of material things" (Duhem, 1893, p. "Just as we abstract from some of the accidental and complicating properties of actual gases to frame the notion of ideal gas, so too we specify the capacities of the ideal agent by abstracting from the incidental limitations on our own collective practice" (Kitcher, 1985, p. 117) . Even though these virtues are present in every scientist to some degree, Duhem noted that in every science there are some scientists that serve as a model that should be followed, scientists who were "able to make the proper distinction between the intuitive and the mathematical minds, where penetrating intuition has sensed the principles and a rigorous deduction concluded to the consequences" (Duhem, 1991, p. 71) . These scientists who serve as a model to all, possess various properties (virtues) and if we follow the line of Duhem's thought on the ideal theory, we can conclude that history provides us with 'traces' of perfect scientists, like Newton, Huyghens, Lagrange, Laplace, Pascal, Guy-Lussac, Amperé, Sadi
Carnot, (ibid), the virtues of whom can be idealized into the properties of an ideal scientist who should serve as an example to all practicing scientists.
Considering good sense as a collection of virtues that an ideal scientist possesses has several advantages. First, it helps us explain why scientists aim at being impartial and why their practice sharpens their good sense. Having the idea of a perfect scientist helps actual scientists develop their skills and try to resemble and act as an ideal scientist would act and it shows them which characteristics and virtues they ought to develop in order to promote scientific progress. We can explain why scientists develop their good sense with practice, since good sense is a cluster of dispositions that are developed through experience. Second, considering good sense as a product of idealization from the virtues of actual scientists into the virtues possessed by a perfect one seems to offer another advantage: it is descriptive of actual scientific practice. Since actual practicing scientists serve as the raw material for the construction of the perfect scientist, it is descriptive exactly because we construct the perfect scientist by idealizing the actual properties of practicing scientists. We can reach actual 0 scientists by the process of de-idealization from the perfect scientist. This preserves Duhem's aim of providing an account of rationality in theory choice that describes actual scientific activity.
Another important advantage of viewing good sense as a property of a perfect scientist is the fact that it seems to help us overcome the charge that Duhem's rationality is retrospective. As pointed in section 3, Duhem undermines his thesis that good sense can guide scientists to a conclusive choice by saying that only empirical evidence conclusively solves and justifies the problem of theory choice, making the concept of good sense post hoc.
But there seems to be a way out of this retrospective character of good sense. By asking themselves what a perfect scientist would do in a particular situation, scientists can employ counterfactual reasoning which can shape the outcome of their decisions and actions. This cluster of virtues which we idealize into the properties of an ideal scientist help us make the concept of good sense prospective, since it can answer prospective questions and therefore can assist practicing scientists when faced with the problem of theory choice. As examined earlier, scientists possess various criteria (the virtues of the theory), which are to be employed in theory choice. These criteria can help us to describe, explain and justify the scientist's decision, but they do not do that uniquely. The problem of theory choice cannot be solved by pointing at some criteria because scientists need to make judgments and weigh these theoretical virtues, and the concept of good sense was employed exactly because Duhem wanted to explain how this is done. If we consider good sense as the properties of a perfect scientist, we can achieve this because the choice of the scientists can be guided by what the perfect scientist, who possesses virtues as impartiality, rectitude, probity, who takes into consideration all evidence, would do. Good sense, then, seen as the properties of a perfect scientist, is neither used as a guide to true theories, nor as justifying the scientist's 1 belief in a theory, but is choice conclusive. It can serve as a guide to scientists when no empirical evidence can determine which of two (or more) rival theories should be chosen.
Let us describe the characteristics of Duhem's account of rationality in theory choice.
First, Duhem departed from normative theories of rationality 9 because he wanted to account for actual scientific practice and therefore did not want to restrict theory choice to some algorithmic procedure. On the other hand, he tried to avoid relativism and to offer a general account which can help scientists promote theories growing to a natural classification. The interpretation of the concept of good sense I examined in this section does not suggest that Duhem was involved in any kind of epistemic justification, which in my opinion would not capture his motivations for developing the concept of good sense. It provides us with a theory of rationality that is loose enough, since it does not restrict scientists to some particular algorithmic rules. On the other hand, the concept of good sense provides general guidance since scientists will need to apply particular skills and virtues in order to promote theories possessing particular virtues. While offering loose guidance, Duhem's account of rationality in theory choice avoids relativity on the one hand and strict formal rules on the other hand.
What the concept of good sense does is serve as a permissive account of rationality, since it excludes possibilities but does not dictate what should be chosen. It is well known that Duhem draws a middle way between scientific realism and instrumentalism. As I see it, he makes the same move in his theory of rationality in theory choice: instead of offering simply descriptive or normative theory, he tries to provide a theory strong enough so that it provides guidance to scientists when they are faced with the problem of theory choice, but also loose enough so that it should not be very restrictive to scientists.
Conclusion
9 The distinction between normative and descriptive theories of rationality is a product of modern debate and is discussed in Lipton (2005) .
By stressing the importance of intellectual virtues in theory choice, Duhem's complex view of rationality helps us recognize that judgment is part of scientific practice. Duhem realized that scientific practice cannot be described as the following of algorithmic rules. We have to consider the involvement of virtues and values in theory choice, but this need not account to a denial of rationality. By invoking the concept of good sense, Duhem accounted for the rationality in science and avoided relativism since he provided some general guidance to scientists faced with the problem of theory choice. I have argued that the concept of good sense can be best understood if, by extending Duhem's ideas about the properties of the perfect theory, we construct by analogy the concept of a perfect scientist. This idealization of a perfect scientist can help us overcome the retrospective character of good sense and therefore preserve Duhem's ambition of both accounting for how scientists actually choose among empirically equivalent theories but also explaining the normative dimension of theory choice.
